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Abstract: 
In most countries, discretionary fiscal policy has often been pro-cyclical: instead of 
dampening the business cycle, actual discretionary policy has mostly magnified it. 
This paper proposes a mechanism that allows discretionary fiscal policy to be 
counter-cyclical. This involves the creation of a Budget Agency which carries out 
expenditures that, in addition to increasing its debt, also raise its saleable assets - and, 
therefore, do not reduce the  net value of its balance-sheet.  One example is the 
construction, during a downswing, of housing and office buildings that will be sold in 
the subsequent upswing. Besides real estate investment, the Budget Agency may also 
undertake “balance-sheet neutral” expenditures in two other sectors responsible for the 
bulk of business cycle fluctuations: business investment and durable consumption. 
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 1. Introduction 
Almost all economic research is focused on either theoretical or applied 
economic analysis. This paper has a different aim: to propose the creation of a new 
institution that may improve the way market economies work – in the same way as 
other relatively recent institutions (like the Central Bank, automatic stabilizers and, 
arguably, the independent Central Bank) have done. 
In most OECD countries, and in almost all EU15 countries, discretionary fiscal 
policy has been pro-cyclical (Fatas and Mihov, 2009; IMF, 2004; Hallerberg and 
Strauch, 2002): instead of dampening the business cycle, actual discretionary policy has 
mostly magnified it. A noteworthy exception was the United States in 1999-2007, when 
discretionary fiscal policy was counter-cyclical (Fatas and Mihov, 2009). 
  This stylized fact can be explained as follows. The declines in output during 
recessions trigger automatic reductions in fiscal revenues and automatic increases in 
public spending, which raise budget deficits and public debts. As a result, financial 
investors become apprehensive about the ability of governments to pay their debts, and 
demand higher risk premiums and interest rates on those debts. By raising the burden of 
government interest payments, this in turn leads to further increases in budget deficits 
and public debts, generating a vicious circle of rising public debts and interest rates. 
Faced with this vicious cycle, governments are then forced to pursue discretionary 
restrictive policies – at a time when the exact opposite policies would be needed.  The 
result is an aggravation of the declines in aggregate demand and a deepening of the 
recessions.
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1 Even governments that do not face higher interest rates as a result of recessions-induced large budget 
deficits tend to embark on restrictive discretionary policies (eg, the UK government since the end of 
2010; see Sawyer, 2011). The previous narrative summarizes the typical responses of European   By contrast, during economic expansions governments have some leeway to cut 
tax rates and to increase discretionary spending. As a result, the debt-GDP ratio does 
not decline as much as it would be possible. 
The purpose of this paper is to propose a device – involving the creation of an 
independent Budget Agency - that can not only prevent the pro-cyclical bias of 
discretionary fiscal policy, but also make it counter-cyclical.    
 
2. The proposed solution: the creation of a Budget Agency 
Before proceeding to the explanation of how the proposed Budget Agency will 
work, it is important to make three remarks. First, the Budget Agency will be an 
institution with the same function of a Central Bank – to adjust aggregate demand to 
full-employment output. Its purpose is to replace the central bank in two cases: when 
countries, like the members of the Eurozone, do not have one; and when - like America 
and many European countries since 2008 and Japan since 1995 - the Central Bank 
interest rate has already been cut to zero but the economy still remains below full-
employment. Second, like a Central Bank a Budget Agency should be independent from 
the political power. For two reasons: to be exempted from the temptation to increase 
spending during business expansions, and to be freed from the political cycle (that is, 
from the pressure to raise expenditure during election years). Finally, it should be borne 
in mind along the following exposition that the bulk of cyclical movements in output is 
associated with just three types of goods: dwellings, business investment goods 
                                                                                                                                                                              
governments to the high budget deficits triggered by the Great Recession of 2008-9. To give one 
example, in Portugal the budget deficit was below 3% of GDP in both 2007 and 2008 and the public debt 
was slightly above 60% of GDP. However, because of the Great Recession fiscal revenue declined by 
11.4% and government spending rose by 6.3% in 2009, leading to budget deficits close to 10% in 2009 
and 2010 and to a public debt of 93% of GDP by the end of 2010. In the context of the Greek sovereign 
debt crisis, this then led to rising interest rates on the public debt, which forced increases in tax rates and 
expenditure cuts that led to a new recession in the beginning of 2011. (machines, equipment and firm’s buildings) and durable consumption goods. The 




Given the previous remarks, I can now turn to the central idea of the paper: how 
the Budget Agency works. During a recession, it issues debt (eg, $50 billion) to carry out expenditures in investment goods which are saleable. The debt thus contracted is 
guaranteed with the value of the acquired investment goods ($50 billion). Examples 
include the construction of residential and office buildings, which are saleable, but not 
of roads or bridges, which are not; the purchase and rehabilitation of decrepit urban 
buildings during recessions that can afterwards be sold; and the construction of 
hydroelectric dams, which are saleable. 
  The result: when the private construction sector is suffering from the usual deep 
contractions during an economic downturn, the laid-off workers and the unused capital 
stock of private firms are utilized in the construction projects promoted by the Budget 
Agency. Afterwards, when the subsequent economic expansion eventually arrives, the 
office and residential buildings constructed and rehabilitated during the recession are 
sold off. Finally, the revenue thus raised is used to pay the initial debt so that, at the 
beginning of the next recession the Budget Agency’s debt is back to zero.
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  In sum, the operation of the Budget Agency involves the following trick. When 
it promotes the construction of investment saleable goods during a downswing, the 
Budget Agency incurs in a deficit which raises its debt, but in the process - and unlike 
the government when it makes investment or consumption expenditures - it acquires 
saleable assets of equal value. As a result, the net value of the Budget Agency remains 
constant during a recession, and it can cut its debt back to zero in the following 
upswing. 
  Now, and as already noted, the bulk of business cycle fluctuations consist of 
wide movements in the output of two other types of goods besides construction goods: 
machines and equipment, and durable consumption goods (notably, autos). Could the 
                                                            
2 The sales of buildings during business expansions bring an additional advantage: they mitigate the 
tendency for the excessive increase in both property prices and property construction during those 
periods. Budget Agency help dampen the cycles observed in these two industries as well? One 
way would be to issue debt in order to grant subsidies to private expenditures in 
machines, equipment and durable consumption goods during recessions, with the 
condition that the debt would be paid off with extra taxes charged by the Budget 
Agency on those goods during the subsequent expansions.
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  Finally, notice that the operation of a Budget Agency has an important 
advantage over that of a Central Bank. Monetary policy has an indiscriminate effect on 
all regions of one country - even though there are always some regions more severely 
hit by recessions than others. By contrast, a Budget Agency can concentrate the 
construction and the rehabilitation of buildings in the regions worse affected by 
recessions. In this sense, the effects of the actions of the Budget Agency are spatially 
more fine-tuned than the effects of monetary policy. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In most countries, discretionary fiscal policy has often been pro-cyclical: instead 
of checking the business cycle, actual discretionary policy has typically amplified it. 
This paper has proposed a mechanism that can not only prevent the pro-cyclical bias of 
discretionary fiscal policy, but also make it counter-cyclical. That mechanism involves 
the creation of an independent Budget Agency which undertakes expenditures that, in 
addition to augmenting its debt, also raise its saleable assets - and, therefore, do not 
reduce the  net value of its balance-sheet.  One example is the construction, during 
recessions, of housing and office buildings that will be sold in the subsequent 
expansions. Besides real estate investment, the Budget Agency can also carry out 
                                                            
3 In this way, the operation of the Budget Agency would be analogous to that of the Central bank when 
this cuts interest rates during economic downturns and raises them in the following upturns. “balance-sheet neutral” expenditures in two other sectors responsible for the bulk of 
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